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ACCELERATING INTEGRATION:
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES IN PUBLIC
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS
Adam M. Shayne*
The current state of lower income housing' in the United
States is one of the most pressing concerns confronting our
country. This nation's future progress and prosperity hinge upon
whether it will commit sufficient resources to supply adequate
shelter for lower income individuals and families on a nondiscriminatory, low-density basis. Integrated public housing would
make great strides toward resolving a number of serious domestic problems that arise from the current concentration of subsidized housing units in minority neighborhoods.
The increasingly visible rate of homelessness turns, to some
extent, upon the lack of housing units available to those of little
or no means. Between 1985 and 1987, the number of persons applying for emergency shelter increased at an average of twentytwo percent each year.2 Approximately 735,000 people across the
nation are homeless on any given night, and this problem no
longer afflicts only individuals.3 Entire families live without permanent shelter, including approximately 100,000 children. 4 A
strong commitment to affordable housing would allow many
homeless persons to obtain adequate shelter for themselves and
their families.
The nation's drive towards integrated public schools could
gain strength if integrated housing reduced the need for more
problematic solutions such as busing.5 Courts have recognized
*

Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 23, 1990.

B.A., Yale University, 1987; J.D., University of Michigan, 1990.
1. The 1981 amendment to the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
substituted references to "lower income" for all references to "low income." Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 402 (1970) (amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1437b-d, 1437f-j). This Note will follow the amended language of the
Act.
2. Tolchin, Mayors Hopeful on Homeless, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., Spolar, No Home-and Not Much Hope, Washington Post Nat'l Weekly
Ed., March 27, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. See generally P. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING (1988) (examining desegregation cases of
the 1970s).
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that "[i]t would be illogical indeed to maintain that neighborhood schools do not reflect the racial composition of the neighborhoods from which they draw their pupils." '6 Residential segregation lies at the core of the inability of school boards to
integrate public schools. Equalizing educational opportunities
requires the integration of both public schools and public
housing.
Finally, the problems of high-concentration public housing are
graphically illustrated in larger cities by the prevalence of gangs
that terrorize many of the housing projects. Drug use, crime, and
vandalism are rampant.7 Children living in the projects are
drawn or forced into gangs and illegal activities at young ages.'
Tenants of these projects are also much more likely to be the
victims of crime than are other members of society.' In a Philadelphia public housing discrimination suit, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit noted that concentrating lower income
housing affected not only those buildings' tenants, but also "occupants of owner occupied dwellings, merchants, and institutions in the neighborhood." 10 Such concentration, the court
stated, "is thus prima facie at variance with the national housing
policy.""
Despite this array of problems, local housing authorities and
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) continue to lag in constructing or rehabilitating public
housing in scattered sites throughout nonminority neighborhoods. Plagued by recent scandals,'" HUD officials have cut
agency programs in an apparent effort to increase accountabil6. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester Hous. Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 86,
327 A.2d 335, 345 (1974). See also Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S.
990, 994 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across the country-North and South-is the imbalance in
residential patterns.").
7. See, e.g., McKinley, Constant Reality in a Project: Fear of Violent Drug Gangs,
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (reporting drug dealing and warring drug factions in public housing projects in Bronx, New York); Schmidt, Bold Plans for Curing
Sick Housing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1988, at AS, col. 1 (describing the problems of drugs,
crime, and gangs in Chicago housing projects and efforts to clean up the buildings).
8. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1987, at 1, col. I (noting that gangs recruit young
children to run errands in Chicago public housing complexes).
9. Schmidt, supra note 7.
10. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970).
11. Id. at 821.
12. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June .17, 1989, at A22, col. 1 (editorial summarizing three
major HUD scandals that came out of the administration of Samuel A. Pierce, who
served as Secretary of HUD under President Reagan from 1981-88).
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ity.'3 Local city councils have also frustrated the progress of integrated public housing by refusing to approve proposed sites
located in predominantly white neighborhoods.1 4 In many cities,
the courts have played the most active role in insisting upon
nondiscriminatory public housing. 5 Although limited by their
roles as members of the judiciary, judges have used a variety of
remedies to coerce administrative and legislative bodies into
augmenting the current supply of public housing in a manner
that will lead to integrated residential neighborhoods.
This Note examines the different remedies employed by
judges to integrate public housing and recommends a standard
approach for courts to employ in the future. Part I describes the
status of local and federal public housing policy in the United
States. Part II examines litigation aimed at achieving the integration of public housing. This Part details short-term remedies
employed by judges in several cities and long-term integration
efforts by the courts in two cities: Chicago, Illinois, and Yonkers,
New York. The Chicago and Yonkers suits exemplify the major
obstacles that plaintiffs and judges face in developing appropriate measures to integrate housing. Next, Part III discusses the
general problems inherent in housing remedies and suggests
three principles to guide judges in devising their orders. Drawing
upon these principles, it then analyzes the array of alternatives
employed by the courts and measures the effectiveness of these
remedies. Finally, Part IV concludes this Note by proposing a
standard set of orders that should successfully implement scattered-site housing programs without extended periods of delay.
I.

FEDERAL AND LOCAL HOUSING POLICY: SEGREGATION AND
CONCENTRATION

Congress passed legislation marking the first major attempt to
construct lower income public housing in 1937." Public housing
in the United States has, since that time, faced two principal
problems: segregation and concentration. In the past, local officials, with HUD funding, built public housing projects to ensure
13. See, e.g., May, Kemp Suspends Housing Program and Plans Overhaul of Others,
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (describing Secretary of HUD Jack Kemp's suspension of three housing programs due to fraud and mismanagement).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
15. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
16. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
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a complete segregation of whites and blacks.17 Housing authorities discriminated in their tenant selection process by placing eligible blacks only in public housing units located in already
black neighborhoods."' In addition, these units were generally located in large, high-rise apartments that contained exclusively
lower income families. This concentration of lower income residents has led to serious problems within public housing complexes and the neighborhoods in which they are located. 9 Unfortunately, both local and federal governments have been
painfully slow in realizing the dramatic adverse social costs that
accrue from concentrating public housing in lower income
neighborhoods.
Since the 1970s, HUD regulations have insisted that new construction sites "avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in
areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons."20 In
addition, a site is unacceptable if it is located in an area of minority race concentration; 2 ' however, cost considerations are
often a barrier to sites in other neighborhoods.2 2 HUD permits a
waiver of its site requirements to meet "overriding housing
needs" or if a sufficient number of units are available "outside
areas of minority concentration. ' 23 The first exception, ironically, describes most large cities. The second exception, unfortunately, describes none. 24 Thus, HUD has consistently approved
construction of projects in minority neighborhoods because of
the pressing need for housing and the lack of "feasible ' 25 alternative sites.
Even in those rare instances in which HUD does seek to encourage the construction of integrated public housing units, local
housing officials usually manage to frustrate the federal agency's
17. See, e.g., P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 206-08 (detailing evidence offered by plaintiffs in Gautreaux litigation, see infra Part II.B.1, that documented purposeful discrimination by local housing officials, aldermen, and the mayor of Chicago); Farley, The Residential Segregation of Blacks from Whites: Trends, Causes, and Consequences, in
ISSUES IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 16, (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights ed. 1985) (noting
that regulations requiring residential segregation in federally funded housing were finally
removed during President Kennedy's administration).
18. See, e.g., P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 206-08.
19. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
20. 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(d) (1989).
21. Id. § 880.206(c)(1).
22. Peel, Pickett & Buehl, Racial Discriminationin Public Housing Site Selection,
in HOUSING, 1970-71 at 322, 362 (G. Sternlieb & L. Sagalyn ed. 1972).
23. 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(c)(1).
24. See generally Farley, supra note 17, at 17-21.
25. "Feasible" here refers to sites in nonminority neighborhoods that are within
HUD's tight cost restrictions.
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efforts.2 6 The United States Housing Act "vest[s] in local public
housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the
administration of their housing programs. '"27 In the past, inability to obtain proper zoning or approval from local officials triggered a waiver of HUD's site standards mandating integration.2 8
As three authors noted in their 1970 article on discriminatory
site selection, "[c]ost, zoning, and local political review-the
same factors that lie at the heart of the system of constraints
facing all LHA's [local housing authorities]-are singled out by
HUD regulation as satisfactory excuses for an LHA's failure to
achieve nondiscriminatory site selection."2' 9 Thus, municipal and
federal officials together have managed to deny thousands of eligible tenants integrated public housing.
Nevertheless, there is a solution to the problems of public
housing: scattered-site housing. Scattered-site housing programs
limit the number of public housing units in any one area, and
particularly in any one structure. The programs seek to integrate
residential areas by restricting the amount of lower income
housing placed in neighborhoods with a large percentage of residents who belong to minority groups.3 0 In several communities
across the country, scattered-site programs, both mandatory and
voluntary, are responsible for successfully providing safe, integrated housing to lower income tenants. 31 Although HUD has
provided neither the political will nor sufficient funding to institute these programs, plaintiffs and judges in public housing discrimination suits have begun to insist on their implementation
in cities found responsible for intentional residential segregation.

II.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF PUBLIC HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION: SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM REMEDIES

Legal challenges to public housing discrimination in the 1940s
resulted in a number of courts upholding the right of states to
26. Peel, Pickett & Buehl, supra note 22, at 362.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (West Supp. 1989).
28. Peel, Pickett & Buehl, supra note 22, at 362.
29. Id.
30. See Stevens, Scattered Low-Cost Housing Offers Renewed Hope to Poor and Minorities, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1988, at All, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
31. See Stevens, supra note 30 (describing a program in Montgomery County, Maryland, that "requires builders of housing developments to dedicate 12 percent of the
dwellings for the use of families with low and moderate income").
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operate housing on a separate-but-equal basis.3 s In the next decade, however, some courts began to rule that intentional segregation by governmental bodies was constitutionally impermissible."s The Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education,3 4 rejecting the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson,8 clearly applied to public housing as well as to
public schools.8 6 School desegregation has remained the more
widely publicized issue, and through the 1970s some Supreme
Court justices continued to insist that the government was not
directly responsible for residential segregation.3 7 Despite the
fundamental link between the two forms of segregation, some
federal courts have excluded evidence concerning residential
segregation when offered by plaintiffs as a means of proving intentional school segregation. 8
Although school desegregation and public housing discrimination cases contain many similarities, there is a fundamental difference in the availability of effective remedies. In school suits,
courts have generally authorized or overseen busing programs
that, once initiated, may indefinitely carry out the desired public
policy. 9 There is no parallel remedy in the field of public housing. Sites, particularly in scattered-site programs, must be chosen on a constant rather than a one-time basis. Scattered-site
housing requires a continuing commitment to its implementation. This requirement creates considerable difficulties for members of the judiciary: judges cannot indefinitely oversee and con32. See Comment, The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low-Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REV. 871, 875 n.30 (1966) (authored by
Jordan D. Luttrell) (citing Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Denard v.
Housing Auth., 203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W.2d 764 (1942); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham,
143 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)).
33. Id. at 876 n.33 (citing Vann v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954)).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
37. See Days, Book Review, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing? 95 YALE L.J. 1737, 1760-61 (1986) (" '[Elconomic pressures and voluntary preferences are the primary determinants of residential patterns.'") (quoting Austin
Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted)). Id. ("[Riesidential segregation was a 'melange of past happenings
prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assignments, or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or ethnic background.' ")
(quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
38. Id. at 1743.
39. See P. DiMONI, supra note 5, at 84-87, 160-64, 255-57, 332-34 (describing courtordered busing plans in Detroit, Dayton, Columbus, and Wilmington).
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trol the programs of local housing authorities. Eventually the
presiding judge must return full control to the appropriate authorities and insist that they continue to develop public housing
projects in a nondiscriminatory manner.
In many public housing discrimination suits, the plaintiffs
have sought only a specific remedy to obtain short-term relief."0
In other cases, however, the judiciary has had to grapple with
the problem of ordering long-term remedies to address past decades of purposeful segregation.4" Rarely, though, have the
courts ordered remedies that direct residential integration in
both the immediate and distant future.
A.

Short-Term Remedies: Near-Sighted Solutions

Short-term remedies in public housing discrimination cases
have often succeeded. Such remedies have consisted of preventing the construction of specific projects in minority neighborhoods or ensuring the building of a particular public housing
complex in a nonminority area. For example, in Bogalusa, Louisiana, a federal court in 1969 issued a preliminary injunction
against the local housing authority and a construction company
to prevent construction of a public housing development in an
all-black neighborhood.' The same year, property owners in the
only middle income black community in Tucson, Arizona, filed
suit to enjoin the placement of public housing in their neighborhood.4 3 In both of these suits, the plaintiffs argued that the local
housing authority had chosen the disputed sites because of their
location in black neighborhoods. 4 ' Regrettably, both suits resulted in no new public housing units being built in either black
or white neighborhoods.
In other cases, judges have ordered local governing bodies to
issue building permits and to desist from otherwise interfering
with the construction of public housing projects in white neighborhoods. 45 In 1970, for instance, a federal judge ordered the city
of Lackawanna, New York, to take whatever steps necessary to
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
43. El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Hous. Auth., 10
Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969).
44. Hicks, 302 F. Supp at 620; El Cortez, 10 Ariz. App. at 133, 457 P.2d at 295.
45. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296
F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
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allow construction to begin on a proposed public housing development in a primarily white neighborhood."' It is rare, though,
that such housing developments are proposed, and even more
rare that they are actually constructed. Furthermore, despite
modest successes in imposing short-term remedies, judges have
been unable to achieve any long-term solutions to the obvious
opposition to integrated housing.
B. Long-Term Remedies: Two Case Studies
Judges who have ordered local governments to set forth longterm public housing plans have faced stiff resistance. The conduct of officials in Chicago and Yonkers exemplifies this concerted opposition to integration. 47 Federal judges found both cities guilty of intentional residential segregation; 48 however,
litigation continued for years as local officials frustrated the
plaintiffs and judges' efforts to implement integration programs.
The long and turbulent histories of these cases reveal the vast
array of remedies available to judges and suggest which methods
are most successful in implementing orders to integrate.
1. Chicago- Dorothy Gautreaux, along with more than
43,000 other black tenants in and applicants for public housing
in Chicago, filed suit against the Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA) and HUD in 1966. The plaintiffs alleged that both the
federal and local government housing agencies had illegally discriminated against blacks by intentionally segregating them in
the administration of lower income public housing projects.4 9
The plaintiffs offered evidence that the site-selection and tenant-selection procedures used in Chicago contained purposefully
segregative features that placed public housing almost entirely
in black neighborhoods and excluded black tenants from the few
projects in white neighborhoods."
46. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 697
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
47. Other cities, such as Detroit, Boston, and Dallas are facing or have already faced
similar public housing discrimination suits. Detroit Hous. Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180
(6th Cir. 1955); N.Y. Times, June 28, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Herbers, Breakup of Housing
for Poor Is Backed in Integration Move, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
48. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
49. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. at 908; P. DIMOND, supra
note 5, at 205-08.
50. See P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 205-08.
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Federal District Judge Richard B. Austin ruled on February
10, 1969, that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proof
against CHA.5 1 Judge Austin urged the city to rectify the situation quickly: "[E]xisting patterns of racial separation must be
reversed if there is to be a chance of averting the desperately
intensifying division of Whites and Negroes in Chicago." 52 The
judge noted that the President's Commission on Civil Disorders
had estimated that Chicago would be fifty percent black by 1984
and that "[b]y 1984 it may be too late to heal racial divisions."5 3
Currently, more than five years after 1984, Chicago remains
one of the most segregated cities in the nation despite ongoing
litigation in the Gautreaux dispute.54 Since 1969, the Gautreaux
plaintiffs have returned to court more than twenty times, 55 not
including separate attorneys' fees litigation. 6 Federal district
courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United
States have adopted a large number of different remedies
designed to begin the program of integration in Chicago's public
housing projects; yet the effectiveness of these remedies has
51. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. at 914.
52. Id: at 915.
53. Id.
54. See N.Y. Times, April 6, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
55. Cases directed primarily at CHA and the city include, in chronological order:
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd sub noma. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Gautreaux v. Chicago.Hous. Auth.,
384 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1974), mandamus denied sub nom. Chicago Hous. Auth. v.
Austin, 511 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1975); Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Gautreaux v. Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459, 66-C-1460, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6269,
1987 WL 13590 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1987).
Cases aimed primarily at HUD include, in chronological order: Gautreaux v. Romney,
448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. 111.1971),
rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972); Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974),
aff'd sub noma. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F.
Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981), afl'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 524 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 535 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 538 F.
Supp 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 538 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. IlM.1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. IM. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp.
1294 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 707
F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1983); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 101 F.R.D. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 743
F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 523 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd,
690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 610 F. Supp. 29 (N.D.
Ill. 1985).
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been extremely limited . 5 Only in the last few years has judicial
action succeeded in increasing the availability of integrated public housing. 8
The Gautreaux litigation produced separate remedies against
CHA and HUD, and the eventual success of these remedies reflected the defendants' gradual willingness to comply. In the suit
against HUD, the plaintiffs charged the federal agency with violating the fifth amendment by supporting the discriminatory
practices of CHA. The district court dismissed the complaint in
1970; however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that HUD had violated both the due process clause of
the fifth amendment and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by funding CHA's segregative housing policies. 9 Relying
on the decision of the court of appeals, the district court enjoined the transfer of twenty-six million dollars from HUD to
CHA as part of the Model Cities Program. 0 Judge Austin, in
issuing the injunction, blamed the city for the negative impact
that the loss of funds would have upon the citizens of Chicago:
"Four thousand would lose their jobs and many other thousands
would be deprived of the benefits derived from the Model Cities
Program. Only the City of Chicago, by failing to comply with its
undertakings, and neither the plaintiffs nor this court, would be
responsible for such a catastrophe."'I On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit once again reversed the lower court.6 2 The appellate
court ruled that although the city did fail to comply with the
1969 judgment order, an insufficient nexus existed between the
CHA housing program and HUD's Model Cities Program to permit the enjoining of the transfer of Model Cities funds to
Chicago 3
The September 1973 final judgment order issued against HUD
by the district court required the department to use its "best
efforts" in cooperating with the local housing authority and in
creating integrated public housing. 4 The plaintiffs had sought to
have the court issue an order that would require HUD to imple57. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
59. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971).
60. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The Model Cities
Program allowed HUD "to grant funds for the purpose of enabling cities to undertake
various programs for the benefit of low and moderate income people." Gautreaux v.
Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1972).
61. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. at 370.
62. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 126-28.
64. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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ment integrated housing in the Chicago suburbs as well as in the
city. However, Judge Austin ruled that a federal court could not
order this type of metropolitan-wide relief when the plaintiffs
5
had proven constitutional violations only within the city limits.6
The court of appeals reversed this part of the lower court's decision,"6 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in Hills v. Gautreaux,6 7 holding that the district court had the authority to order HUD to institute remedies beyond the city's boundaries
because the agency had violated the Constitution and federal
laws. 8
After HUD lost the case before the Supreme Court, the Department agreed to a demonstration program that provided two
to three hundred units each year to Gautreaux families. HUD
decided to use a housing assistance payment program to provide
relief to members of the Gautreaux class. From 1976 to mid1986, nearly 3,000 families (approximately 10,000 persons) benefited from new housing opportunities due to the consent decree. 9 Thus, HUD eventually accepted its duty to integrate public housing and succeeded in implementing a program that
increased the number of available integrated housing units.
The Chicago City Council and CHA proved less willing to
comply with the courts' orders. A few months after he found
CHA guilty of intentional discrimination, Judge Austin issued a
supplemental judgment order that allowed the housing authority
to complete the "proposed projects in black areas that had triggered the lawsuit, but ordered that three-fourths of future family units would have to be built in white areas."7 The judge also
required that the next 700 units be built in "white areas" to mirror those already approved for minority neighborhoods. 71 Furthermore, the judgment order prohibited CHA from constructing any projects with more than 120 dwelling units, taller than
three stories, or in areas already containing more than fifteen
65. Id.
66. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 1974).
67. 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976).
68. The Court's ruling also distinguished Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), a
Detroit school-desegregation case in which the Court refused to permit a busing plan
that extended beyond the city limits into suburban school districts. Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. at 297-99.
69. Speech by Alexander Polikoff, Executive Director, Business and Professional
People for the Public Interest (BPI), The Law as an Instrument of Social
Change?-Twenty Years of Gautreaux (May 1, 1986), at The Palmer House, Chicago,
Illinois (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
70. P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 208.
71. Id. at 209.
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percent CHA residents. 7' Finally, the court directed CHA to
" 'use its best efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units as
rapidly as possible' in conformity with the 'scatter,' low-rise,
low-density objectives of the decree.""
For a year after the court's order, CHA did not propose any
new public housing sites to the city council.74 After a number of
conferences, the plaintiffs obtained from Judge Austin an order
that required CHA to submit proposed sites to the council according to a specific timetable. Yet CHA stalled for another year
by appealing the order to the court of appeals and to the Supreme Court.75
CHA finally submitted proposed sites for at least 1500 units to
the Chicago City Council and the Chicago Plan Commission, a
city agency, on March 5, 1971.7" By July 1, the council and the
planning commission had approved the acquisition of enough
sites to provide fewer than 200 dwelling units that conformed
with the court's 1969 judgment order. 77 No other sites were approved by February 2, 1972, when plaintiffs once again brought
the case to court. The district court held that the city's failure to
approve at least 200 sites violated plaintiffs' rights under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment..7 Hence,
the district court held that the law requiring city council approval of public housing sites would no longer apply to CHA's
actions. 79 Furthermore, Judge Austin set forth a strict timetable
for CHA that required the agency to begin construction as soon
as possible, including construction on sites not formally approved by the city council.8 "
In an effort to force implementation of intra-city relief, the
plaintiffs filed suit again in 1974, seeking to have a commissioner
appointed to take control of public housing programs in Chicago. 8 1 Judge Austin rejected such an approach. Instead, he appointed a federal magistrate to serve as a master in order to review patterns of racial segregation in public housing as well as
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 922 (1971). See also P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 209.
1972).
76. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Ill.
77. Id. at 829.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 830.
80. Id. at 830-31.
1974).
81. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ill.
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CHA's efforts to comply with court orders.2 In both 1980 and
1984, the plaintiff class attempted to have a receiver 8" appointed
84
over the CHA, but the district court denied this relief.
After several more years of little progress in public housing
integration, the district court finally agreed to place CHA's scattered-site program into receivership on May 14, 1987. 85 Federal
District Judge Marvin Aspen noted the court's frustration with
CHA's failure to abide by the many orders issued since 1969:
Enough is enough. It is fundamentally clear that in light
of CHA's track record, not only in CHA's present form
but also in its multitude of previous incarnations, this
case is well beyond the point where bureaucratic squabbles between local and federal agencies will be tolerated
as an excuse for noncompliance with the important remedies sought by the plaintiffs, agreed to by the parties and
ordered by the Court."6
Thus, in the first five years after the court's initial remedy order, CHA built no new housing in a city of three million people. 7 The ensuing five years produced only 117 new units. 8 After 1979, CHA added a few hundred additional units. 9 On three
separate occasions, the plaintiffs sought to have the scatteredsite program placed into receivership so that interested parties
could administer it, but not until May 1987 did a federal judge
finally agree that the CHA should no longer retain control over
the program.
After being placed into receivership, Chicago's scattered-site
program made some limited progress toward integrating the
city's public housing units. Within one year, 15 buildings with 96
apartments had been renovated, were under construction, or
were awaiting HUD approval.90 By September 30, 1989, the receiver reported that rehabilitation was complete for 14 buildings
82. Id. at 37-38.
83. In such a case, a receiver would take over management of CHA, or of a particular
program normally administered by CHA officials.
84. Speech by Alexander Polikoff, supra note 69.
85. As noted in Gautreaux v. Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459, 66-C-1460, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6269, 1987 WL 13590 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1987).
86. Id.
87. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
88. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
89. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6269, 1987 WL 13590.
90. First Anniversary Report of Receiver at 1. Gautreaux v. Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459,
66-C-1460 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1988).
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with 72 apartments and that an additional 23 buildings with 147
units were under rehabilitation. 1
Although the HUD remedies placed several hundred tenants
into subsidized housing in the late 1970s, the CHA remedies did
not achieve any sort of compliance until the late 1980s. Even
after the court removed the obstacle of city council approval of
site proposals, CHA managed to delay development and construction of public housing sites throughout the city. In addition, there was little coordination between HUD and CHA's activities to comply with the courts' orders. Both agencies
demonstrated a desire to use appeals and bureaucratic devices to
contest any attempt by the federal courts to insist upon a nondiscriminatory policy for site and tenant selection.
2. Yonkers- The United States Department of Justice filed
a suit in 1980 against the city of Yonkers, New York, and its
board of education, alleging segregation in both its public
schools and public housing. 2 Litigation in the case extended
into 1985, when the district court found the city liable for intentional housing and school segregation.13 Federal District Judge
Leonard B. Sand criticized Yonkers for engaging in "a thirtyyear practice of consistently rejecting the integrative alternative
in favor of the segregative." 94 Following a six-day hearing to debate appropriate remedies, Judge Sand issued a housing remedy
order on May 28, 1986.15
The order began by enjoining the city, its officials, and employees from impeding the integration of public housing.' In the
most far-reaching section of the opinion, the district court ordered the city to submit site proposals for 140 units of family
public housing within thirty days and site proposals for an additional 60 units within ninety days. 7 The order also required the
91. CHA Scattered Site Housing Program Status Report #11 at 2, Gautreaux v.
Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459, 66-C-1460 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20 1989) (covering the period July 1,
1989 thru September 30, 1989). The receiver had also prepared sites for the construction
of several hundred new apartments; however, stringent HUD regulations limiting the
total development cost of subsidized units prevented any progress on new construction.
Id. at 1-3. Thus, once again, the federal agency frustrated implementation of the court's
orders.
92.

Days, supra note 37, at 1764-65.

93.

United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

94.

Id. at 1368.

95.

United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

96.

Id.

97.

United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. at 1580-81.
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city to submit development proposals9" for the first 140 units
within ninety days of HUD's approval of the sites.9 9 Furthermore, the court insisted that within fifteen days Yonkers "execute a grant agreement with HUD for the 1984-85 program year,
with the condition that receipt of the grant depends on submission of acceptable sites for 140 units of family public housing." 100 Each of these provisions of the housing remedy order
also contained a "devolution" clause allowing the plaintiff (Justice Department) and the plaintiff-intervenor (NAACP) to submit sites, proposals, or a grant agreement to the court for approval any time that the city failed to carry out its assigned task
within the allotted time period. 1
The housing remedy order also required the city of Yonkers to
set up an "Affordable Housing Trust Fund," using at least
twenty-five percent of certain funds it received from HUD.' °2
The district court ordered the city to use its "best efforts" to
secure additional funding for the trust, which would assist in financing development of lower and moderate income housing by
private developers.' 0 3 Finally, Judge Sand gave city officials six
months to submit a plan for the development of additional public housing units in the predominantly white residential areas of
northwest or east Yonkers.'0 4
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the housing remedy order along with the original liability ruling.'01 The city, however, had already defaulted. Yonkers failed
to submit the proposed sites for 200 units before the thirty and
ninety-day deadlines. In addition, the city council did not agree
upon a plan for additional public housing units within the sixmonth time period. Judge Sand set out to ensure that the city
complied with his housing remedy order. He appointed an
"outside housing advisor" in early 1987.106 He also ordered the
98. Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 941.404 (1989). Development proposals contain a
description of the project, information about the site, and estimated construction costs.
Id.
99. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. at 1581. The court ordered
HUD to advise the city of HUD's approval or rejection of the site proposals within fifteen days of their submission. Id. at 1580-81.
100. Id. at 1580.
101. Id. at 1580-81.
102. Id. at 1581-82.
103. Id. at 1582.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
106. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 637 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reporting the history of the case).
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Yonkers Board of Education to return to the city certain vacant
portions of land so that the city could use the land for public
housing. ' In addition, the judge enjoined city officials from taking any further action in implementing private development
projects until it proceeded with its obligations to public
housing. ' e8
The district court began 1988 by entering a consent judgment
to which both parties had agreed. '0 9 The consent judgment committed the city to build 200 units of public housing on seven
specific sites and "to implement a long-term plan to achieve the
goal of 800 units of subsidized housing that had been recommended by the plaintiffs."' 1 0 Yet Yonkers attempted to disavow
the consent judgment and even "offered to return approximately
$30 million of federal funds in the event the Supreme Court
should set aside the public housing provisions of the Housing
Remedy Order."" In June, the district court entered a new
long-term order which the city council subsequently rejected."'
Finally, at the end of July 1988, Judge Sand demanded that
the city council either enact a specified legislative package detailing the city's long-term housing plan or face contempt
charges and stiff fines. The fines against the city began at $100
per day and doubled in amount each day of continued noncompliance. Furthermore, each council member voting against the
legislation would be fined $500 per day and imprisoned after ten
days of noncompliance. 1 3 Judge Sand excoriated the city council
for its refusal to comply with the lower court's order:
"[Th]ere does have to come a moment of truth, a moment of reckoning, a moment when the City of Yonkers
seeks not to become the national symbol of defiance to
civil rights and to heap shame upon shame upon itself,
but to recognize its obligation to conform to the laws of
the land and not step by step, order by order, but in the
way in which any responsible community concerned
about the welfare of its citizens functions. That is not go107. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
108. Id. at 1415.
109. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 448 (2d Cir. 1988).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 449.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 450 (describing district court's unpublished order).
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ing to be accomplished
ordinance." 1 1

by this court adopting the

When the city council failed to pass the legislative package on
August 1, the district court imposed the sanctions. 115 The court
of appeals affirmed the order, although it set a ceiling for the
fines against the city at $1,000,000 per day." 6
Refusing to reconsider the sanctions against the city, the
United States Supreme Court agreed to stay the fines against
the individual council members in order to rule on the permissibility of such an action.11 7 After thirteen days of fines against
the city, totalling $819,100, two council members changed their
votes and the housing resolution passed the city council."$ By
this time, the City of Yonkers had been forced to lay off more
than 400 employees, to limit sanitation services, and to close all
public libraries and parks. 1 9
When the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of sanctions against the individual council members in Spallone v.
United States,12 0 the five to four majority did not decide that
the fines were inevitably beyond the scope of a district judge's
authority. Instead, the Court's majority held that the district
court judge should have waited to determine if the fines against
the city would be sufficient to achieve compliance before levying
additional fines against the opposing council members. 21 In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the Court should defer to the
district court's more knowledgeable vantage point.'2 2 He also
noted that the added fines against the council members might
"secure compliance more promptly, minimizing the overall disruptive effect of the city sanctions on city services generally and
long-term compliance with the Consent Decree in particular." 2 3
Finally, Justice Brennan commented, "I hope such a message
[from the majority] will not daunt the courage of district courts
who, if ever again faced with such protracted defiance, must
114. Id. at 451 (quoting the lower court's statement at the August 2, 1988 contempt
hearing).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 460.
117. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 631 (1990).
118. Feron, City Averts Bankruptcy and Cancels Layoffs-New Sites Sought, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
119. Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 633.
120. Id. at 633-35.
121. Id. at 634-35.
122. Id. at 635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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carefully yet firmly secure compliance with their remedial
124
orders."
As litigation concerning the opposing council members' sanctions persisted, Yonkers made little progress towards achieving
the goals required by the district court. Not one new Ufnit of
public housing has been built." 5 In addition, Henry Spallone,
one of the leading council members opposed to integration, was
elected mayor of Yonkers in November 1989.126 Spallone's political ascendancy and his claim of a public mandate has left Yonkers even further from reaching some sort of agreement with the
district court over its public housing policy. 2 7
III.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIES
IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS

The political reality of cases such as Yonkers and Gautreaux
is plain: no one wants public housing in his or her neighborhood.
Residents fear the three major concerns commonly associated
with public housing: crime, decreasing property values, and integration. Scattered-site public housing seeks to reduce these
fears, but white residents, who traditionally have controlled political mechanisms, still successfully avoid placing public housing
in their own neighborhoods. The few projects placed in white
areas purposefully admit only elderly or white tenants.
In public housing discrimination litigation, a judge possesses
considerable flexibility in fashioning an equitable remedy when
she exercises her authority to correct a constitutional violation. "2' 8 The judge's "task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the
Constitution."' 29 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court insisted in
a voting rights case, "the court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate
124. Id. at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Feron, How Yonkers Has Held Off on Housing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1990, at
D22, col. 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. (noting that Mayor Spallone has expressed interest in disputing the 1988
consent decree approved by Judge Sand).
128. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (holding
that after a school board fails to offer suitable remedies, the district court has broad
power to design a remedy to implement integration).
129. Id. at 16.
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the discriminatory effects
of the past as well as bar like discrimi' 30
nation in the future.'
Despite its broad authority to implement remedies, the judiciary in these cases has struggled with the conflict between the
plaintiffs' right to integrated public housing and the defendant
local governments' right to limited interference with their legislative and administrative duties. Unfortunately, the remedies
created by the courts have been astoundingly unsuccessful in securing plaintiffs' rights. These remedies have permitted defendant city governments and HUD to retain enough authority to
frustrate any real progress toward residential integration.
Some public housing discrimination suits such as Gautreaux
ironically have resulted in the complete cessation of subsidized
housing construction in any neighborhood. This result hits hardest those who are most in need "ofany kind of shelter; it is therefore the result that judges should most carefully attempt to
avoid. When attempting to fashion remedies that achieve tangible results in public housing discrimination suits, courts should
follow several key principles. First, and most importantly, remedies must immediately initiate some form of site selection and
construction or rehabilitation. The courts must prevent any delays in the availability of new public housing units. Judges must
exercise great care to ensure that remedies do not result in a
decrease in the opening or availability of housing. Second, the
remedies must also implement long-range plans that establish
appropriate goals for the distribution of housing sites throughout different neighborhoods, thereby effectuating residential
integration.
Finally, both the long-term and short-term plans should allow
local housing authorities as much input and control over scattered-site programs as they are willing to provide. If the local
authorities propose reasonable sites according to a strict timetable established by the court, the judge should permit implementation of the plans. Any failure to meet set deadlines, however,
should result in an immediate transfer of authority back to the
courts or court-appointed officials. The judiciary cannot allow
local authorities, whose discriminatory policies first caused the
litigation, to continue to obstruct efforts to initiate scattered-site
housing programs and residential integration. Nevertheless, it is
important that local administrative bodies have the opportunity
to leave behind past wrongs by embarking on a, new path. The
machinery of government will function more efficiently if the jui30.

Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
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diciary can rely on local officials to administer their own public
housing programs.
As the various court orders in public housing discrimination
cases demonstrate, judges have failed to focus adequately on
these three key principles necessary to appropriate relief for the
plaintiffs. As a result, courts have not instituted short-term and
long-term plans for public housing integration that adequately
benefit the plaintiff classes.

A.

Deadlines for Site Proposals and Construction

One remedy, common to both the Gautreaux and Yonkers
suits, required the local authorities to propose and develop a
specified number of sites for public housing according to a timetable. This "deadline" remedy permitted the local authorities to
select the particular sites, provided that a given percentage of
those sites were located in predominantly white areas. The advantage of this type of order is that it sets both short-term and
long-term goals for the city, and it avoids more punitive
measures.
The problem with the "deadline" remedy is that it has proven
unsuccessful. Both in Chicago and Yonkers, for instance, the cities defaulted on proposing the required number of sites by the
courts' deadlines. The remedy has failed because the courts allowed local officials to retain too much authority for too long.
Most cities involved in public housing discrimination suits already have a long history of opposition to integrated housing; it
should not take an additional year, or several years, to realize
that city officials will not comply with already missed deadlines.
In all likelihood, local officials will not quickly change their behavior and abide by court-ordered deadlines if courts do not impose additional sanctions.
A timetable establishing deadlines for site proposals and construction is essential to court-ordered, scattered-site programs.
However, the judiciary must insist on adherence to the timetable, and a judge must strengthen a deadline order with sanctions
or alternative implementation plans that take effect immediately
if the city fails to abide by the original schedule. Thus, the important issue is what type of reinforcement for deadlines will ensure the progress of scattered-site programs.
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B. Bypassing the City Council
The judges in Gautreaux and Yonkers took vastly different
approaches in their dealings with recalcitrant city councils. In
Gautreaux, the district court judge eventually bypassed the Chicago City Council and approved public housing sites himself, despite a state law requiring council approval of the sites. 3 1 This
decision facilitated the process of constructing public housing
units in white residential areas. Of course, Judge Austin did not
decide to use this remedy until the city's aldermen had given
him ample proof of their refusal to approve public housing sites
in nonminority areas. The bypass ruling came in 1972, three
years after the judge issued the first remedy in the Gautreaux
litigation.1 32 Appeals of the ruling delayed its implementation
for another two years.
Thus, beginning in 1974, CHA no longer needed approval
from the Chicago City Council for public housing sites. However,
CHA had a history of opposition to integrated housing similar to
that of the city council. The court failed to recognize that it had
surmounted only one of the two major obstacles to residential
integration. The local housing authority retained sufficient
power to frustrate efforts by the plaintiffs to obtain relief until
1987, when Judge Aspen ordered CHA's scattered-site program
into receivership. 3 3 It was only at that point, eighteen years after the original finding of discrimination in the case, that the
court relieved the culpable parties of control over public housing
sites and placed the scattered-site housing program into the
hands of private organizations.
Thus, bypassing the city council generally helps to achieve
short-term goals but is not particularly useful in long-term planning. It only removes authority from local legislators, allowing
housing officials to continue to frustrate integration programs if
they so choose. As such, this remedy cannot be expected to
achieve the desired compliance without more direct measures.
C.

Fines

In Yonkers, the district court judge sought to force the city
council to accept publicly a plan for integrated public housing.
131.
132.
133.

Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. 111.1972).
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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He declined to bypass the city council, insisting that "this Court
will stay its hand until it is conclusively established that no voluntary compliance will be forthcoming. ' 134 After Yonkers had
defaulted on three of the important deadlines established by the
housing remedy order, Judge Sand continued to resist contempt
sanctions and attempted to encourage voluntary compliance by
the city council. 13 5 The city council proved quite stubborn and
agreed to the legislation only after the court imposed drastic
fines on the city.
Even after the Yonkers City Council finally passed the resolution accepting a plan for housing integration, the local authorities had not yet proposed or accepted any sites or initiated construction on any public housing units. Thus, the New York
judge's approach delayed even further the commencement of
construction while he battled with the city council over passage
of a resolution. This tactic aspired to promote long-term remedies, but sacrificed the possibility of any short-term improvements in the availability of public housing units.
Imposing substantial fines upon a city, as evident in Yonkers,
is a severe measure used to spark local authorities to act. Particularly when the city faces the necessity of laying off public employees, city council members realize that their votes are responsible for the loss of patronage and support." 6 Yonkers faced
bankruptcy within a matter of weeks.1 - 7 Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the fines will fail to move city officials or
13 8
public sentiment.
Furthermore, those who suffer the most from fines against the
city are without fault. These punitive measures adversely affect
those who rely the most upon city services and jobs. Lower income citizens, including the plaintiffs in the litigation, are most
likely to feel the impact of a curtailment of city services and job
lay-offs. These people should not suffer for the recalcitrance of
city officials. Fining the city also reduces the resources available
134. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80-CIV-6761, 1986 WL 6159
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1986).
135. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 635-38 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
136. Feron, supra note 118.
137. Id.
138. In Yonkers, a bumper sticker stating "Bankruptcy is better" became popular
during the city's financial crisis, which was brought about by the court's sanctions.
Fodevaro, Yonkers Race Is Viewed As Vote on Housing Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1989,
at B8, col. 2.
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to comply with the court's orders. 3 9 Furthermore, although fines
may result in immediate action, they often cause bitter resentment as well, and thus jeopardize long-range interests of returning full control to the local authorities. The courts need to
consider constructive, rather than punitive, measures to encourage city officials to support scattered-site housing programs.
Sanctions against individual city officials who are directly responsible for the lack of compliance with a court's order impose
punishment on those who are at fault and do not place any direct costs on the city. 4 0 However, such fines may well make city
officials martyrs in the eyes of their constituents,'" and these
sanctions still do not ensure compliance with the court's orders.
Individual contempt citations may also instill resentment in the
punished officials towards the policies supported by the court.
Rather than wage a war against the recalcitrance of a small
group of city officials, the courts must first seek to grant the
plaintiffs the relief that they desire.

D.

Masters and Outside Housing Advisors

The appointment of a master or outside housing advisor may
facilitate the proposal or approval of scattered-site public housing, but such an appointment is a means to an end rather than a
real solution to the problems facing the court. Appointments
may frustrate efforts to seek immediate relief because the appointed persons add another level of bureaucracy to the housing
process. Masters or advisors may take more time to produce reports than expected or desired. The court may find an advisor
extremely useful in pondering the specifics of any housing plan;
however, the implementation process remains in the court's
power.

139. Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 643 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D.R.I. 1980)).
140. The Supreme Court's narrow decision in Spallone did not rule out the permissibility of such fines. Rather, the Court held that such fines could not be imposed concurrently with the fines against the city. 110 S. Ct. at 634-35.
141. McFadden, Final Days of Defiance for Yonkers: Council Had to Decide the
Fate of the City, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at A15, col. 1.
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Receivership

Placing a city's scattered-site housing program into receivership may be a final effort by a court to relieve an obstinate local
body of its responsibilities. Such a measure is quite drastic, and
the court should consider it only if numerous other remedies
have failed. However, the judiciary need not wait twenty years
to decide that a local housing authority cannot be permitted to
carry on its efforts to frustrate court-ordered integration. One
disadvantage to a receiver is that the time it takes the receiver
to familiarize himself with the city's land holdings is much
greater than if the local housing authority retains its authority.
Of course, receivership cannot permanently replace the local
housing authority. At some point, the court will have to return a
city's housing program to the appropriate administrative agency,
preferably before the agency becomes too accustomed to functioning without it.
F.

Devolution Clause

Another possible form of relief in public housing discrimination suits allows the plaintiffs to submit their own proposals if
the city housing authority fails to meet the court's deadline. The
housing remedy order in Yonkers included provisions that required the plaintiffs to submit to the court a grant agreement,
site proposals, and development plans only after the city missed
the court-ordered deadline.1 42 The court also added a more
sweeping devolution clause, reserving the authority to appoint a
third party to prepare any materials required by the order.1 3
Although Yonkers defaulted on the deadlines, Judge Sand refrained from effectuating the alternative provisions, choosing instead to force the city council to abide by the original plan.
Devolution clauses permit a court to set both short-term and
long-term housing goals. Furthermore, this remedy accords the
local authorities significant control over public housing if they
choose to accept it and meet minimum requirements. Finally,
the devolution provisions assure that the plaintiffs will obtain
relief because they can make their own proposals as soon as the
city fails to meet its obligations. If the plaintiffs are incapable of
142.
1986).
143.

United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577, 1580-81 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 1581.
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preparing the proper documents and proposals, the court may
appoint a neutral third party, an expert in the field, to do the
work and receive compensation from the defendants. 4 4

IV.

CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED ORDER FOR IMPLEMENTATION

When selecting remedies to eliminate illegal segregation in
public housing, the courts must seek to implement public policy
by promoting residential integration. Scattered-site housing programs can and do work. These programs are the key to eliminating discrimination in public housing. In addition, they help to
reduce the serious problems brought about by the concentration
of lower income housing. Therefore, the judiciary must be more
firm in requiring local housing authorities to initiate such programs rapidly. A commitment to scattered-site housing requires
remedies that focus upon both short-term plans and long-term
goals. Although judges must permit local authorities to rectify
past injustices in site selection, the judiciary cannot allow these
authorities to continue to deny the rights of citizens who seek
equal opportunities in obtaining subsidized public housing.
The structure for a model judicial order in public housing discrimination suits emerges from the synthesis of those remedies
that closely adhere to the key principles discussed above.
Clearly, any standard order must have a deadline for site proposals and the development of a specified number of subsidized
units within non-minority neighborhoods. This timetable must
insist upon both short-term plans and long-term goals for implementing the court's order, and the judge must demand strict
compliance with the deadlines.
The standard order should also include a devolution clause
that permits the plaintiffs or a third party appointed by the
court to submit to the judge any required proposals or plans
that the defendants have failed to complete within the allotted
time period. Such clauses avoid time-consuming bickering and
bargaining between the court and the defendants, and they permit the plaintiffs to take an active part in effectuating their own
desired relief. In addition, the standard order should propose
placing the scattered-site program into receivership if the plaintiffs can demonstrate at a later date (one year, not twenty years)
that the defendants have continually refused to agree upon acceptable long-term housing plans.
144.

Id.
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An additional incentive for short-term compliance with the
court's order would be an injunction prohibiting the payment of
salaries to those officials directly responsible for the city's failure
to meet its obligations. 1" For instance, if the local housing authority officials refused to comply with a judge's request for a
certain number of proposed sites within thirty days, the judge
would enjoin the payment of salary to those officials for that
thirty-day period. Theoretically, this remedy is easier to accept
than the imposition of fines, although both remedies have a similar effect. A salary injunction rests on the premise that if officials do not abide by their obligation to uphold the Constitution
and faithfully execute their duties, they should not receive compensation. More practically, the city itself does not lose money;
rather, it retains part of its coffers because of the officials' irresponsibility. In this manner, those who depend upon city services do not suffer for the actions of public servants.
Through the use of these measures, courts may allow city officials to decide whether they will assume-or abdicate-their
constitutional responsibilities. Local authorities need to realize
that the integration of scattered-site public housing must and
will occur with or without their help. As the success of scatteredsite housing continues across the country, more local housing authorities may begin to implement voluntarily these programs
aimed at achieving effective nondiscriminatory housing. However, judges must stand ready to insist upon compliance with
their orders in the face of resistance to constitutionally mandated integration.

145. A distinction might be drawn between fining city officials and temporarily withholding their salaries until they fulfill their legal obligations. The latter type of sanctions
do not appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Spallone. See supra note
140 and accompanying text.

